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Wang Hui (1997: 310) points out, what the May Fourth thinkers shared was only a common attitude toward
tradition, not a unified theory; their proposals for establishing "newness" were quite different from each other.
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played, Wang Xiaoming (1 999) challenges the May Fourth paradigm by arguing that it repressed various
literary trends and individuality and promoted a pragmatic, "pro-collectivity" view of literature. Michel Hockx
(1999) rejoins that to further understand the complexity of history, the pluriformity within the May Fourth
cannot be overlooked and a binary view of history needs to be avoided. Therefore, although treating the May
Fourth as a totality against a broader historical background might be justified, it is equally important to pay
attention to its internal differences and tensions, particularly to marginalized trends and figures. In light of the
ongoing scholarly reflections on the May Fourth and Chinese modernity, I now focus on just such a
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 To Believe or Not to Believe: Zhou
 Zuoren's Alternative Approaches to
 the Chinese Enlightenment*
 Tonglu Li
 Ť This article is a revision of the third
 chapter of my dissertation, Beyond
 Belief: Zhou Zuoren's Rationalist Writing
 and the Chinese Enlightenment. Dur-
 ing the revision, Dr. Rania Huntington
 provided many suggestions. I also thank
 the two MCLC reviewers for their in-
 sightful comments, and Kirk A. Denton
 for his meticulous editing.
 It is said that those who sold their soul to the Devil became shad-
 owless men. The same can be said about those who dedicated
 their soul to God. Those who do not believe in the existence of
 the soul are probably safe, because they do not have anything to
 sell and therefore can stand outside of trouble, even though they
 cannot avoid being condemned by others.
 -Zhou Zuoren (1935^: 483)
 Introduction
 Resistances against May Fourth "enlightenment" (qimeng) have been
 celebrated as alternative versions of modernity that "decenter and
 destabilize" the mainstream paradigm (Chow et al. 2008: 3). But in this
 alternative modernities program, the complexity of the so-called center is
 often overlooked. Within the May Fourth movement, there are irreducible
 differences in position and different strategies of position taking. As
 Wang Hui (1997: 310) points out, what the May Fourth thinkers shared
 was only a common attitude toward tradition, not a unified theory; their
 proposals for establishing "newness" were quite different from each other.
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 Surveying the roles the journal New Youth (Xin qingnian) and the Literary
 Association (Wenxue yanjiu hui) played, Wang Xiaoming (1 999) challenges
 the May Fourth paradigm by arguing that it repressed various literary
 trends and individuality and promoted a pragmatic, "pro-collectivity" view
 of literature. Michel Hockx (1999) rejoins that to further understand the
 complexity of history, the pluriformity within the May Fourth cannot be
 overlooked and a binary view of history needs to be avoided. Therefore,
 although treating the May Fourth as a totality against a broader historical
 background might be justified, it is equally important to pay attention to
 its internal differences and tensions, particularly to marginalized trends
 and figures. In light of the ongoing scholarly reflections on the May Fourth
 and Chinese modernity, I now focus on just such a historically marginalized
 figure who was once a leading member of the May Fourth camp, Zhou
 Zuoren (1885-1967), and explore how his imagination and critique of
 enlightenment constituted a countermodel to some mainstream ideas
 and practices.1
 Zhou has been highly regarded as an essayist; however, his contributions
 as an enlightenment thinker have not been fully recognized. From the late
 1910s to the mid-1 940s, he wrote numerous miscellaneous essays that can
 be characterized as fragmentary, intertextual, random, and versatile. During
 this period, Zhou was part of various intellectual trends, such as humanism,
 cosmopolitanism, individualism, and anarchism, and he eventually turned
 to nationalism and Confucianism (Kiyama 2004: 86). But it needs to be
 pointed out that neither the "nationalism" nor the "Confucianism" Kiyama
 mentions should be taken at face value, because Zhou recognized the
 former as a necessary condition for individual survival and development
 and the latter as a version of individualistic humanism.2 Despite their formal
 and thematic complexity, Zhou's essays demonstrate a surprising constancy
 by focusing on an overarching theme: enlightenment, as he summarized in
 1946.3 Zhou set as the mission for his enlightenment project to illuminate
 readers (as individuals) with modern (rational and scientific) knowledge
 1 By "mainstream" I mean the ideas and
 practices that were once prominent in
 the cultural field during the Republican
 period, such as the May Fourth's attack
 on tradition, the leftist movement, and
 the various modernization endeavors
 led by the KMT government (such as the
 "New Life" movement [Dirlik 1975]) in
 the 1930s, and the culture of national
 defense against the Japanese in the
 1940s. These ideas and practices have
 often been recognized as "mainstream"
 in the official historical writing during
 the post-Republican period in either the
 Mainland or Taiwan. Zhou's marginaliza-
 tion in official historical writing is due
 mainly to two factors: his critical attitude
 toward mainstream approaches during
 the 1930s, and his collaboration with the
 Japanese during the war in the 1940s.
 This marginalization of Zhou started to
 change in the 1980s. See Huang 1999:
 205-288, and Sun/Huang 2004: 1-9.
 2 Even though Zhou was very familiar
 with the Chinese cultural heritage and
 since the 1930s had a public image as
 a "semi-Confucian and semi-Buddhist"
 hermit, what he carried out toward
 traditional learning is a réévaluation and
 rediscovery based on his humanist and
 rationalist position, not a simple "return"
 to tradition (Qian 2004: 9).
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 3 In 1946, Zhou summarized his intel-
 lectual career in a poem entitled "My
 Writings." Borrowing Buddhist concepts,
 he expressed the idea that he did not
 despise utilitarianism, but that he had
 his own vows ( shiyuan ). Regarding
 writing as a sincere activity of giving
 dharma ( fashi , truth and law) to the
 public, he wished that one or two
 among his numerous works would
 have some influence, and he would not
 worry about being vilified as long as his
 books still had readers. He wrapped up
 the poem by saying that his intent in
 such an undertaking had been constant
 over the years (1946: 33). His endeavor
 to offer dharma to the public through
 writing became the defining characteris-
 tic of his enlightenment project.
 4 For biographies of Zhou Zuoren, see
 Qian 2001; Ni 2003; and Zhi An 2009.
 For works dedicated to his life during
 the Japanese occupation, see Kiyama
 2008. The strong nationalist sentiment
 against Zhou is still present with some
 intellectuals, as demonstrated in Li
 Zehou's dialogues with Liu Zaifu, in
 which they clearly expressed their
 preference for Lu Xun over Zhou as their
 role model (Liu 2009: 7).
 so that they could be disenchanted from all forms (religious, political, and
 ideological) of belief.
 As a writer, Zhou adjusted his positions and his rhetorical strategies
 for different historical contexts. His writing career can be approximately
 periodized as follows: (a) 1918-1922. Zhou set a humanistic tone for the
 new literature with his ideas of a "literature of humanity," a contribution
 that has been well recognized (Lee 1973: 20; Daruvala 2000: 43), and he
 was actively engaged in criticizing Chinese traditions; (b) 1923-1927. During
 this period he gradually noticed dangerous tendencies in the practices
 of the May Fourth camp - a violent attitude toward tradition and a
 tendency to establish itself asa new cultural hegemony - and he eventually
 dissociated himself from it; (c) 1928-1938. He criticized the rising leftist
 literary movement directly and indirectly, regarding it as a betrayal of the
 true mission of enlightenment and carried out an enlightenment project
 of his own (Ji 2010: 30); (d). 1939-1945. Besides his public obligations in
 collaborating with the Japanese occupation government, he continued his
 enlightenment project, with an emphasis on the cultural identity of Chinese
 people.4 During the 1 930s and the 1 940s, Zhou avoided engaging in political
 and intellectual debates and focused on the historical, the everyday, and
 insignificant matters. His hostility toward mainstream practices, his obscure
 writing style and invocation of traditional expressions, categories, and
 forms, along with his collaboration with the Japanese, made him the
 counter-image of his older brother Lu Xun, and his enlightenment project
 became a pleasure for his own entertainment - not a means to sociopolitical
 revolution, but an end in itself, a process that can be enjoyed without
 worrying about the results.
 In this essay, I read Zhou's complex writings as a systematic and coherent
 construction of his alternative approach to enlightenment, instead of as
 random responses to the crises and contingencies of history. Such a reading
 strategy is inspired by Susan Daruvala, who has analyzed the particular ways
 in which Zhou formulated his individual-focused alternative response to the
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 dominant discourses in the context of Chinese modernity. As Daruvala (2000:
 11-12) summarizes, Zhou accomplished it "first, by his use of traditional
 aesthetic categories; second, by the importance he ascribed to locality in
 a writer's identity and self-representation; and third, by constructing a
 literary history in opposition to the dominant one." Focusing on the "leisure
 literature" created by Zhou, Lin Yutang, and others in the 1930s, Charles
 Laughlin (2008: 1 2) argues that their essays constituted an alternative to the
 "redemptive literature," which mainly concerns grand projects. Laughlin
 also highlights Zhou's invocation of the late Ming tradition in the process
 of formulating his strategies "alternative" to the mainstream. Although
 "tradition" did play an important role in Zhou's alternative approach, it
 is also a category he reinvented based on his understanding of the rather
 "Western-oriented" concept of enlightenment. Although marginalized for
 its insignificance relative to the grand projects of the day, Zhou's form of
 enlightenment allows us to understand not only the intellectual foundation
 of his literary creation, but also the complexity of the modern intellectual
 field. By analyzing its intellectual framework, its critique of both traditional
 beliefs and the religiosity of modern mainstream practices, and its agenda
 to disenchant people with knowledge, I argue that Zhou's alternative
 approach to enlightenment based on the dichotomy of knowledge and
 belief constituted the most comprehensive criticism of the mainstream
 practices of his time. In insightfully critiquing the mainstream practices
 of producing blind followers of political and ideological struggles, Zhou
 developed a disinterested, knowledge-based version of enlightenment to
 disenchant people, and that disenchantment was destined to be repressed
 in the historical context of China.
 Knowledge vs. Belief: (Re)Defining the Foundation of the
 Enlightenment
 One of the most learned intellectuals in modern China, Zhou Zuoren
 regarded "knowledge" as a central issue of modernity, so much so that he
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 5 After their split, the causes of which
 are unknown to outsiders, Zhou and
 Lu Xun seldom exchanged arguments
 directly. In the 1930s, they became the
 symbolic leaders of liberal and leftist
 intellectual positions, respectively, and
 they debated indirectly by writing on
 the same cultural and social phe-
 nomena. Shu Wu (1993: 291-363) has
 provided a detailed account of their
 relationship. See also Wang Xirong
 2005: 37-136.
 named his studio "the Hall of Knowledge" (Zhitang). Since his early years
 studying in Japan (1906-1911), he extensively read works of literature,
 Greek mythology, psychology, anthropology, medical history, folk studies,
 and intellectual and religious history, all of which are facets of Zhou's
 larger pursuit of "learning of humanity" ( renxue ) (Huang 1999: 3). Among
 his diverse interests, Andrew Lang's cultural anthropology, Havelock Ellis's
 sexual psychology, and Darwinian biology worked together to enable Zhou
 to shift his attention from society or the nation as a totality to human
 beings as individual entities entitled to satisfy their culturally mediated
 desires while bound by biological constraints: as an individual, one should
 be concerned less with one's obligation as a subject of the state than with
 constructing an everyday life with artistic taste, but more important, one
 should approach the world with knowledge instead of belief.
 During the first half of the 1920s, Zhou sought to forge a universal
 epistemologica! foundation for the enlightenment project; such a
 foundation was developed out of his long-term intellectual struggle
 with the dichotomous relationship between knowledge and belief.
 Having received less attention in modern China than in the European
 Enlightenment, the dichotomy is central in Zhou's conceptualization of
 enlightenment. He once passionately introduced the Utopian New Village
 movement, which originated in Japan in 1918, but soon became aware
 that he did not have the necessary passion and faith for promoting the
 movement. In commenting on the Bible, he recognized that to have a faith
 is to accept wholeheartedly an external authority as the source of truth.
 A belief, to him, is delusive and marks the denial of human rationality
 (1920: 39). In 1921, he experienced more intense intellectual anxiety: he
 suffered from a "weakness" that prevented him from becoming a dedicated
 follower of one belief, and that made it a struggle to decide which path
 to take (1921b: 22-23). The year 1923 saw a critical turn in his personal
 and intellectual life: a breakup with Lu Xun5 and disillusionment with the
 religious and fanatical pursuit of a new intellectual and social order.
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 In a discussion on women's liberation (1923b)# Zhou is concerned with a
 lack of "common knowledge" (changshi) not only among the uneducated,
 but also among the educated. In his proposal, common knowledge, a
 simplified version of his "learning of humanity" that approximately
 corresponded to the high school curricula, was not pragmatic knowledge
 for solving everyday problems such as cooking or calculating interest, but
 the instrument to "know thyself," as the ancient Greek philosopher Thaïes
 taught. Knowing oneself means to avoid living unconsciously according
 to animalistic instincts or social conventions. Only when people truly
 know themselves as human beings, Zhou believes, could a self-liberation
 movement come into being (1923b: 1-2). The important message in this
 text is not about the content of common knowledge, but about the mission
 of enlightenment: enlightenment should not use indoctrination to replace
 conventional beliefs with knowledge, but instead should create modern
 rational individuals who could avoid blindly following established doctrines
 or external authorities.6
 Zhou observed that knowledge is often treated as dogma; people
 tend to preserve temporary views of life, which are based mainly on
 limited experiences and knowledge, and reshape them into a singular and
 unalterable criterion of truth (1923c: 90). When the internal differences
 are erased and simplified, or when ideas belonging to particular historical
 moments are eternalized, dynamic and diverse knowledge turns into a rigid
 and tyrannical doctrine. To Zhou, enlightenment does not mean replacing
 "old beliefs" with "new knowledge" as unquestionable truth, but a critical
 attitude toward the "new knowledge" itself; otherwise the "new" will
 soon become rigid doctrines. The priority of the enlightenment, therefore,
 should be disseminating common knowledge to enable people to better
 understand its proper function: "know thyself."
 To know oneself is to become a modern subject. As Zhou confessed
 in a 1924 essay, he was experiencing at the time a painful process of self-
 interrogation. He came to realize that he knew nothing, but there were
 6 There seem to be similarities between
 the views of Zhou and Kant regarding
 the nature of enlightenment, which Kant
 (1991: 54) defines as "man's emergence
 from his self-incurred immaturity. Im-
 maturity is the inability to use one's own
 understanding without the guidance of
 another. This immaturity is self-incurred
 if its cause is not lack of understanding,
 but lack of resolution and courage to
 use it without the guidance of another."
 However, whereas Kant emphasizes the
 importance of will (the courage to use
 one's reason publicly), Zhou focuses on
 the cultivation of reason (with scientific
 knowledge as its basis).
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 neither mentors who could guide him to form his own worldview "to
 judge everything" nor "a simple way" to follow (1924c/: 334). Ha Yingfei
 (2007: 80-82) argues that the atheist views of Bertrand Russell played
 an important role in Zhou's disillusionment with religion and with social
 movements characterized by strong religiosity. Russell lectured in Beijing
 in 1920-1921, and Zhou would have been familiar with his ideas, but there
 is no acknowledgment of such an influence in Zhou's writings. I would
 suggest that his denial of the "simple way" of belief did not come from
 one influence but from reflection on mainstream intellectual practices. As
 he later admitted, lack of coherence and consistency notwithstanding, his
 decentered knowledge system demonstrated a multiplicity and diversity
 that prevented him from adhering to a single intellectual way (1934b: 406).
 Zhou once discussed belief and knowledge as equal modes of
 approaching the world in relation to action in his commentary on
 Turgenev's view of Don Quixote and Hamlet
 According to Turgenev, the protagonists of these famous works
 embody two fundamentally opposing types of human nature,
 which are the ultimate source of culture and thought: Don Quixote
 embodies faith and idealism, and Hamlet embodies skepticism
 and analysis. With enthusiasm, the former approaches the truth
 in which he believes even at the cost of life. The latter criticizes
 society according to rationality, and eventually becomes an egoist
 who cannot even have faith in himself. (1922c: 576-577)
 These opposing types of human nature provided Zhou a framework for
 understanding the conundrum he had experienced in his participation in
 the mainstream enlightenment movement: faith and idealism might lead
 to blind belief and violence, but they constitute the fundamental drive for
 action; skepticism and analysis are crucial for the individual to avoid living
 an unexamined life, but might become a hindrance to dedicated action.
 As Turgenev does in his analysis, Zhou tries to reconcile the two extreme
 qualities by viewing them as complementary as well as contradictory, but he
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 later comes to see them as incompatible and eventually rejects all doctrines.
 At a time when enlightenment was losing out to national salvation,7
 Zhou insisted on thinking in a more philosophical way; he refused to accept
 the Nationalist or the Communist discourses on national salvation and
 revolution because of their innate religiosity. The 1930s marked both the
 end of the mainstream enlightenment and the rising influence of leftist
 culture. As Lu Xun turned to the leftist camp, and the liberal Hu Shi sought
 to reform society through elites working within the KMT government, Zhou
 eventually chose to observe and contemplate the world from a distance,
 refusing to bow to the pressure to join social movements:
 Some might think they are blessed for having a simple faith. For
 me, however, I am fonder of a pure and clear contemplation of
 the world. Life and society are too complicated. Still, accurate
 observations are more interesting than chanting and praying,
 though I have chosen to fall into hell and there might not be a
 way out for the rest of my life. (1928c: 490)
 His words "fall into hell" cannot be dismissed as hyperbole; he clearly
 understood the criticism he was going to face from the leftist camp, whose
 spiritual leader was his older brother, Lu Xun. From the late 1920s, Zhou
 was publicly vilified as a hermit who sought to escape harsh realities and
 was unable to catch up with the progressive trends of his time. The term
 "simple faith" (danchun de xinyang) demonstrates his rejection of the
 religious impulse to embrace a single school of thought and its coherent
 system forjudging all things (1927e: 38). A simple faith, or an unconditional
 trust in and devotion to an ultimate authority (God, in religious terms),
 could offer him nothing more than intellectual simplicity. Having a simple
 faith did not mean only an unwavering faith in the existence of God; it also
 meant relying on such a faith as the ultimate arbiter of truth.
 In Zhou's view, knowledge was an antidote to belief, and the
 dissemination of common knowledge, or the knowledge people use to
 7 Li Zehou (1987) argues that in modern
 China, the enlightenment project was
 overtaken by national salvation in the
 1930s. Zhou's choice, therefore, put him
 in direct opposition to the dominant
 intellectual discourses.
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 8 Zhou alludes to the European Enlight-
 enment with the term "the eighteenth
 century." He seldom cites particular
 Enlightenment thinkers in his writings,
 so it is safer to regard this reference to
 "the eighteenth century" as his general
 identification with the Enlightenment
 in spirit.
 understand themselves as human beings, was the only viable approach to
 eliminating popular superstitions and other unfounded beliefs. Radical
 sociopolitical measures would not succeed without such knowledge. He
 writes, "To eliminate such superstitions and outdated ethical codes, we
 have to resort to scientific knowledge. Laws can erase the superficial
 external appearances, but only science can eradicate their roots" (1928b:
 476). In other words, institutional legal action cannot affect the way
 people think. Seven years later, Zhou restated his views in discussing the
 meaning of the ambiguous term fenghua (decency, or the improvement of
 morals and manners): there are many such ambiguous and mystical terms
 in the Chinese language, and "people have been using them as the non-
 construable and grotesque magic figures (fuzhou) in the Daoist religion. I
 think the cure is common knowledge. This seems to be a prescription of the
 eighteenth century, but it might be the right one in China, where people
 do not have a healthy consciousness" (1935b: 601-602).8 Even during a
 time of national crisis, when the Japanese army had occupied Manchuria
 and was on the verge of a full-scale assault, Zhou remained obsessed with
 ideas of enlightenment and saw disseminating common knowledge as his
 primary concern.
 Zhou's full embrace of knowledge and total rejection of belief occurred
 in the 1930s and went hand in hand with a new self-identification. To him,
 historically formed knowledge is incompatible with belief (1936f: 348).
 With a clear awareness of the differences between the Greek and Christian
 traditions in the West, he chose to be affiliated with the former. In a 1934
 essay, he declared, "I feel that I have finished being a literātus ( wenshi ).
 Now if I am to be categorized, and if I have to find a dignified title for
 myself, I will use 'lover of wisdom (aizhizhe).' This only means that I still
 have some interest in worldly affairs, and I want to know something about
 them" (1934f: 369). The term wenshi, which appeared in many of Zhou's
 essays, is also the translation of "scribe" in the Bible. In retrospection, he
 regarded wenshi as those who knew only how to use writing to promote
 214 • To Believe or Not to Believe
This content downloaded from 129.186.176.218 on Mon, 25 Mar 2019 20:54:26 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 or defend certain doctrines but did not have any profound understanding
 of the real world. Zhou chooses "lover of wisdom/' the original meaning
 of the ancient Greek term for "philosopher," and avoids the modern term
 "philosopher" ( zhexuejia ) to indicate that he is concerned with principles of
 the real world, not "metaphysical issues" (xuanxue) (1937 1 699). A lover of
 knowledge, Zhou dedicated himself to providing his own observations of
 the world, refusing to share ideological premises with other intellectuals.
 By the late 1 930s, Zhou pushed this reasoning to such an extreme that
 he dismissed the significance not only of domestic political and ideological
 struggles but also of the ongoing war with Japan. Following the Greek
 paradigm, he promoted the attitude "knowing for knowing's sake,"
 which he regarded as an antidote to the obsession with pragmatic issues
 in Chinese culture. In one essay, Zhou introduces S. H. Butcher's views on
 the Greek love of knowledge:
 From the dawn of history, to know seemed to the Greeks to be in
 itself a good thing apart from all results. They had a keen-eyed
 and disinterested curiosity for the facts of outward nature, for
 man - his ways and his works - for Greeks and Barbarians, for the
 laws and institutions of other countries. They had the traveller's
 mind, alert in observing and recording every human invention and
 discovery. (Butcher 1904: 92; Zhou 1936e: 488-489)
 Zhou fully accepts Butcher's nostalgic imagination of the Greeks' pure
 pursuit of knowledge, and he exemplified this attitude himself perfectly
 when one month after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in July 1937, Zhou
 wrote an essay on the vernacular names of various weeds (1937e: 96);
 this seemingly trivial matter is presented as a way to persuade readers
 to investigate Chinese dialects and folk cultures, through which common
 people's real life and thought could be learned. His indifference toward
 the looming war received harsh and often unfounded criticism (Shu Wu
 1993: 60).
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 9 For similar comments, see also Zhou
 1935e: 138 and 1944a: 181-185.
 At a time when national salvation was the focus of the intellectual
 community, Zhou repeatedly wrote about and justified his interests in
 ghosts, arguing that even though documents on belief in the supernatural
 did not tell the "scientific" truth about life and death, they were valuable
 articulations of the subjective truth of human life, inherent and genuine
 human emotions, and "joy, fear and their desire" (1934c: 288-289). He
 wrote, "People may wonder, Even if you do have leisure time, why do you
 [waste it] talking about river ghosts? True, I do not have to talk about river
 ghosts, but the belief related to river ghosts and the people who hold this
 belief are worth investigation" (1930a: 649).9 Therefore, instead of simply
 denying the ridiculous ideas and rites used in memorializing the dead,
 condemning them as superstition or arbitrarily banning them, he supported
 research on "life after death," modeled after the cultural anthropologist
 James Frazer. He believed that a solid ethnography of the life of ghosts
 could better reveal the truth of the Chinese people's psyche than empty
 talk about native moral values (1935e: 138).
 Focusing on the individual's intellectual maturation through acquiring
 common knowledge, Zhou imagined an alternative enlightenment. His
 obsession with knowledge, instead of with popular doctrines, revealed
 the tension between enlightenment as an intellectual endeavor and
 enlightenment as an instrument serving social revolution or national
 salvation. To him, enlightenment was not a social movement for producing
 political subjects of the modern nation-state, but a process of cultivating
 a rational attitude among individual citizens. Such objectives should
 be independent of, and irreducible to, the grand projects. He tried to
 convince his audience that common knowledge was relevant to real life
 and ultimately beneficial to it. Even during the war, Zhou promoted the
 idea that knowledge, rather than social and political engagement, was
 the best way to "save oneself" (1944b: 109-110). This was particularly
 urgent in China where the "knowing for knowing's sake" attitude was
 urgently needed (1944f: 248). Zhou's urgency was obviously out of step
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 with the times, when national salvation was a sacred duty and nationalism
 threatened to drown out any alternative voices.10
 Traditions Rediscovered: Popular Beliefs Regarding Nature,
 Sexuality, and the Body
 Zhou Zuoren shared with other May Fourth enlightenment thinkers, such
 as Chen Duxiu, a disdain for traditional Chinese culture. But whereas Chen
 Duxiu centered his attack on the Confucian ethical system, Zhou adopted
 a cultural anthropological perspective in his critiques. Such a perspective
 enabled him to pay attention to diverse cultural practices, including the
 Daoist religion, which he interpreted as a form of shamanism and which he
 saw as the dominant belief in Chinese society.11 In the picture of country
 life he painted in his writings, the resistance to reform or modernization
 was rooted in the villagers' beliefs in ghosts, magic, alchemy, and miracles.
 With such a belief system, they waged wars against Christians, organized
 their own royal courts and performed rituals ascending to the throne,
 burned down Western-style schools, rejected government efforts to prevent
 epidemics or to do social surveys, and practiced magic medicine (1926b:
 727). Zhou believed that violent, irrational practices, such as those of the
 Boxer movement, were at the root of the backwardness of rural life and
 contaminated the intellectual climate of the whole nation. He might have
 overgeneralized the nature of Chinese culture as Daoist/shamanistic (in
 1925 he even regarded Confucianism as Shamanistic), but in doing so he
 distanced himself from the Marxist "progressive" view that rural turmoil
 and conflicts were forms of resistance to foreign cultural invasions and
 domestic class oppression.
 Drawing inspiration from Andre Lang's evolutionist cultural
 anthropology, Zhou saw folk and popular culture as a kind of pathology
 to diagnose the disease in Chinese peoples' minds: "Regarding research
 on Chinese culture, focusing on the highest representative achievements is
 one approach. Nevertheless, our conclusions might be more accurate if we
 10 For example, Liang Shiqiu once
 proposed that writings during the war
 did not always have to be directly related
 to national defense; he received harsh
 criticism for these sentiments from leftist
 intellectuals. Nonetheless, the critics
 might have ignored that Lu Xun (1936),
 the most prominent leftist, himself held
 an opinion similar to that of Liang when
 he wrote that a soldier also needed
 everyday leisure besides fighting his
 battle.
 11 Lu Xun had the same opinion as
 Zhou, but did not invest much energy in
 exploring the details. See his letter to Xu
 Shoushang (1918).
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 12 The texts Zhou analyzed in his writ-
 ings included Taishang ganying pian
 (Treatise of the exalted one on response
 and retribution), Yinzhi wen (D. T.
 Suzuki's English version is titled Yin Chih
 Wen: The Tract of the Quiet Way), Jueshi
 zhenjing (True teaching to enlighten the
 world), and Yuli chaozhuan (Under-
 world of ghosts). These texts belong to
 the genre of "book of virtues" and were
 popular during the eighteenth century.
 Their authors and dates are unknown.
 13 The Zhou brothers both demonstrated
 genuine interest in natural sciences in
 their early years, but science seemed
 not to have a significant place in Lu
 Xun's major literary works.
 focus on the overall average achievements" (1930c: 674). Folk and popular
 culture represented the consciousness of the majority. He refused to accept
 the importance of social class in his analysis, arguing that people might
 live in different political and economic conditions, yet they still had more
 commonalities than differences in thought. To be more exact, the majority
 of the populace had the same beliefs despite their different backgrounds.
 In a project spanning several decades, he spent a significant amount of
 time analyzing popular cultural texts,12 with a particular focus on three
 aspects of traditional Chinese thought that had long been slighted in the
 mainstream intellectual history but that are crucial for a full understanding
 of humanity: people's views of nature, sexuality, and the body.
 In the politically charged cultural field of Republican China, discussions
 of social and cultural conflicts and political and ideological struggles
 usually dominated. Although "Mr. Science" (Sai xiansheng) was a slogan
 popular during the May Fourth period, the human-nature relationship did
 not attract much intellectual attention.13 Zhou, however, observed that in
 Chinese culture there was a lack of genuine interest in nature as an object
 independent of human consciousness. He saw such a lack as detrimental
 to the construction of the modern self, and he advocated cultivating a
 scientific attitude among the populace to treat nature as an independent
 existence. To that end, Zhou believed that genuine interests in botany
 and zoology should be established first through writings about natural
 history in literary styles or literary works that emphasize natural history
 to cultivate people's interest in nature (1936e: 490). Zhou's own essays on
 natural subjects - such as "Plants, Trees, Insects, and Fish: Things Living in
 Water" (1930a) - manifest his enlightenment agenda in persuading readers
 to cultivate interests in the apolitical, the trivial, and the natural, although
 they could also be read as allegorical social commentary.
 From another direction, Zhou delineated the ways in which nature
 had been misrepresented in Chinese culture. The Confucian tradition
 advocated an overhumanized view of nature by projecting human ethical
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 codes on natural phenomena and on animals, such as in the owl, the lamb,
 and the crow. The owl, a symbol of unfiliality in folk culture, was believed
 to eat its aged mother. Zhou rebuffed: "The legend that 'the owl eats its
 mother' might have existed since ancient times. Even so, there is nothing
 abnormal with the owl except for its unusual appearance and voice. There
 is no evildoing, just behaving as a carnivorous animal" (1935d: 743-744).
 The lamb kneeling down to its mother when suckling and the crow feeding
 its aged mother were seen as positive examples of filial piety (1936e: 490).
 Though these kinds of stories were perhaps justified to convey didactic
 agendas, they hindered people from seeing the truth of nature.
 The Daoist religion distorted nature by providing a mystical
 interpretation of natural phenomena, such as the idea that living things can
 transform from one species into another. In his extensive reading of Qing
 dynasty biji (jotting notes) during the 1930s and 1940s, Zhou encountered
 numerous cases such as "corn earworm transforms into thread-waisted
 wasp, and rotten grass transforms into firefly, all seem to resemble the
 metamorphosis capability of Daoist fairy figures" (1936c: 127); he attributed
 the origin of these time-honored beliefs to inaccurate observations, which
 later generations accepted without critical examination (1938: 82). He
 believed that such popular beliefs were still alive among modern people,
 and that it was more important to cleanse them of these beliefs than to
 promote resistance to Japan, for instance. In 1943, he planned to write a
 modern version of the Balanced Inquiries (Lunheng), modeled after Wang
 Chong's original treatise, to correct these unfounded beliefs (1943b: 777),
 but such a plan never materialized.14
 Zhou explored the roots of the repression of human desires from the
 perspectives of biology, cultural anthropology, and sex psychology, and
 he argued that human beings were essentially part of nature and had to
 be understood as such. Biology enabled Zhou to define human nature as
 universal,15 which laid the intellectual foundation, starting in the late 1 920s
 when Marxism became a dominant trend, for a rejection of the Marxist
 14 Wang Chong (27-97 CE) wrote Bal-
 anced Inquiries to criticize the metaphysi-
 cal and mysterious interpretation of the
 he ven-human relationship that was
 popular during the Han dynasty.
 15 The role that biological traits play in
 human nature is still debated in cultural
 anthropology. See McCurdy/Spradley
 1987: 15-48 for representative opinions.
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 definition of man as economic animal whose nature is defined by his
 social class. To him, "human beings evolved from animals" (1918: 86), so
 biology was foundational to an understanding of human life. Darwinism
 was introduced in China mainly as a social theory, and social Darwinism
 had dominated intellectual discourse since the late Qing (Pusey 1983).
 Zhou was unusual in terms of his loyalty to the biological implications of
 Darwin's theories. In Zhou's words, "I do not believe that there exists a
 classic in the world that can be used eternally as the ultimate doctrine to
 guide human life. Only biology that records the life of organisms qualifies
 to be a reference for human beings to establish their morality" (1919:
 130); this statement can be regarded as his fundamental understanding
 of human nature. For Zhou, it was important to explore what is common
 to humans, what things are necessary and healthy in human life, as well
 as both the evolution and the degradation of human life (1934a: 354). The
 biological nature of human beings is a blessing and a curse: they evolved
 from "animals" and the basic needs and desires should be regarded as
 legitimate; as part of nature, they had to give up the illusory pursuit of
 the transcendental world.
 Biology alone, however, could not establish the legitimacy of human
 desire. When sexuality became a major site for contesting gender inequality
 during the May Fourth movement, Zhou turned to cultural anthropology
 for strategies to reveal the absurdity of traditional restrictions on
 sexuality. Starting from the 1920s, Zhou wrote numerous essays criticizing
 the disciplining of sexual conduct; he concluded that the superstitions
 on sexuality in folk beliefs and ethical codes could be traced back to
 shamanism. Most of the taboos were out of the fear of the magic power
 of sexual conduct:
 China is not a nonreligious country, though magical factors might
 be more dominant in people's thought than the religious ones.
 Fenghua, the favorite term of supporters of the Confucian ethical
 codes, is very mystical. It bears significant supernatural implications
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 and obviously is a term from shamanism. (1925b: 295)
 "The survival of the savage" ( manxing deyiliu) in modern times is a concept
 he borrowed from cultural anthropologist E. B. Tylor. By demystifying
 the term fenghua and defining it as "savage" (yeman de), Zhou intends
 to destroy its legitimacy in regulating sexual conduct. In the same essay,
 he continues to argue that to understand the Confucian ethical codes,
 one had to understand shamanism and that Confucianism was only a
 form of shamanism with a civilized appearance. One might question how
 "scientific" Zhou's cultural anthropological approach is - after all, "savage"
 is more a moral judgment than a "scientific" category - but Zhou widened
 the debate about the tradition's views of sexuality and situated what had
 been regarded as something essentially "Chinese" in a broader intellectual
 context.
 To understand the various forms of sexuality, Zhou resorted to the sex
 psychology of Havelock Ellis (1 859-1 939), whose seven-volume work, Studies
 in the Psychology of Sex, had become Zhou's "book of enlightenment" since
 the time he studied in Tokyo in the 1910s. In retrospect, Zhou admitted
 that Ellis helped him understand the diversity and complexity of human
 behavior and taught him to contemplate it with a sympathetic attitude that
 was always ready to understand, tolerate, and accept any natural sexual
 behavior (1936a: 344), even "perverted" practices such as cunnilingus (a
 term for which Zhou could not find a corresponding expression in Chinese).
 Ellis's point was that this practice (cunnilingus) was natural because it also
 existed among animals and savage races; only when it became exclusively
 sexual did it become pathologically perverted (1933b: 167). Zhou embraced
 Ellis's spirit of tolerance toward the full range of human sexuality.
 Inspired by Ellis, Zhou developed the idea of renqing wuli (human
 emotions and the principles of things) as a criterion to judge human
 behavior. The term renqing wuli first appeared in He guanzi (Pheasant cap
 master), a book believed to have been written during the Warring States
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 16 The debate on the nature of Chinese
 medicine continues today and is still
 within the discourses set by the intellec-
 tuals of the Enlightenment in the 1920s.
 The key issue is still whether Chinese
 medicine is scientifically founded.
 17 Some earlier thinkers such as Liang
 Qichao (1873-1929) also held hostile at-
 titudes toward Chinese medicine.
 period. In Zhou's use of the term "the principles of things" was centered
 on hard science, but this science should also make room for a consideration
 of "human emotions." In his essay "The Psychology of Sex#" Zhou cites Ellis
 to underline the importance of human emotions:
 A shock is often thus caused, for we seem to be in the presence of
 something, which is "unaesthetic." It seems to be forgotten that
 not even the most recognized methods of sexual intercourse can
 well be described as "aesthetic." It is not understood that here,
 amid the most intimate mysteries of love, we are in a region where
 the cold and abstract viewpoints either of science or of aesthetics
 are out of place unless qualified by more specially human emo-
 tions. (Ellis 1933: 297-298; Zhou 1933b: 167)
 In this passage, Ellis highlights - above law, morality, and even science -
 the critical role of human emotions in judging human sexual conduct.
 The balancing and blending of science and emotions that Ellis advocates
 was central to Zhou's writing, and "the principles of things and human
 emotions" became a core concept in his struggle against old moral and legal
 regulations and the popular metaphysical ideas about human behavior.
 With the goal of cleansing irrational beliefs from people's minds, Zhou
 investigated the medical treatment of the body. He examined traditional
 Chinese medicine, in part by reading medical histories such as Superstition
 in Medicine , by Hugo Magnus (1842-1907), and The History of Medicine,
 by C. G. Cumston (1868-1928). In the twentieth century, traditional
 Chinese medicine came to be regarded as unscientific, mystical, and
 "metaphysical"; indeed, it was nearly abolished by the KMT government
 in 1929. In response, doctors of Chinese medicine claimed that it was
 part of the "national essence" (gi/oct//).16Zhou shared a hostility toward
 Chinese medicine with other participants of the May Fourth Enlightenment
 such as Lu Xun, Chen Duxiu, and Hu Shi.17 But Zhou was the only one to
 contextualize its development in terms of a universal medical discourse. He
 sought the irrational "roots" of Chinese medicine. Borrowing Cumston's
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 idea that medicine progressed along a historical line from instinctive,
 religious, and magic to scientific medicine, he provided his interpretation
 in a 1928 essay:
 Human civilization is a unity in that humanity is a unity. Cultural
 differences originated from people's different orientations in
 channeling their desires. Nevertheless, all cultures observe the
 same principles of humanity. . . . Therefore, there is only one
 knowledge and art. Since people discover universal principles at
 different times, there are different forms of knowledge and art;
 but the differences are in degree, not in essence. (1928 d: 492)
 Zhou avoids essentialized views of the cultural difference between China
 and the West and assesses both according to the same universal notions
 of progress in medicine. In this respect, Chinese medicine is not a national
 essence, but an earlier stage of the general development of medical
 knowledge.
 Zhou observed numerous cases in which magic and superstitions were
 widely applied in Chinese medicine, such as the use of human flesh as
 medicine; selling one's disease to others by packaging money and throwing
 it on the roadside for others take away; escaping from malaria by moving to
 other places; and women's passing their leprosy on to others through sexual
 intercourse. 18Surveying these popular beliefs and practices and speculating
 on the overall situation in China, Zhou was skeptical that China was already
 a modern, "civilized" society. In a 1927 essay, he stresses the urgency for
 promoting scientific knowledge and eliminating superstitions in medicine:
 It is easy to imagine how much worse the overall situation will
 be in China, if superstition is allowed in the physiological and
 pathological fields in which the validity of a statement could be
 easily verified by science. It is no wonder that politics, morality,
 and human activities are all occupied by superstition. The revival
 or survival of the savage in modern times becomes unavoidable.
 These issues should not be ignored. The cliché "promoting science
 18 For examples of such writings, see
 Zhou 1926a, 1937d.
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 and eliminating superstition" is indeed the most important project
 for national salvation. (1927 f' 171)
 Here Zhou establishes a connection between the "trivial" issues regarding
 the care of the body and the grand project of national salvation. Yet in his
 writings the individual body is treated not as a symbol of the (sick) national
 body, but as what needed to be saved from the curse of superstition so
 that it could constitute the very foundation of national salvation. For Zhou,
 political or social reform was bound to fail without a successful replacement
 of "savage" thoughts with scientific knowledge.
 The theoretical framework Zhou applied in his criticism of Chinese
 traditions can be generally defined as evolutionary, an anthropological
 theory that "provided a hierarchical scale of civilization on which classical
 Greece and Rome were clearly ranked as superior to primitive societies"
 (Humphreys 1978: 2). China was relegated to the lower end of this
 hierarchical scale, because no matter how the social or political structure
 changed, what dominated people's consciousness were the same old
 "savage" beliefs. Zhou's reluctance to adjust his position to follow the
 "progressive" social trends was the product of his strong faith in the intrinsic
 value of the enlightenment. Whereas other enlightenment intellectuals
 were talking about enlightenment in the past tense and moving on to the
 promotion of sociopolitical and ideological movements, Zhou insisted that
 the mission of the enlightenment had yet to be accomplished.
 Resistance against the "Return of the Dead": Enlightenment as
 Self-Reflection
 Even as he explored, along with other thinkers, the modern legacy
 of traditional beliefs, Zhou reflected carefully on the practices of the
 mainstream enlightenment itself; in this, Zhou distinguished himself as a
 critical thinker. His critical attitude toward the "new" intellectual movement
 emerged from his own reflections on Chinese traditions. In his 1920 essay
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 on shamanistic thought in the countryside cited earlier, he proposes two
 solutions for eliminating shamanism: let it evolve into a monotheist religion
 or let it die out in the face of scientific thought. Zhou discussed the first
 approach only once, in 1921, and he soon gave it up (1921c: 354). He
 dropped the second radical approach when republishing the essay in 1 926:
 What I wanted to revise is that now I think it is impossible to have
 "radical and thorough" changes. It is useless to carry out the sci-
 entific movement in the fashion of a missionary movement. The
 best way is to popularize education and resort to the rationality
 of citizens. It is a pity that the current educational institutions are
 not reliable in developing rationality, and there is less hope for
 such a development. (1926b: 729)
 What Zhou finds lacking in mainstream practice is not the idea of promoting
 science, but the ways in which science is promoted. His denial of the
 possibility of the "radical and thorough" change is actually a denial of
 any revolutionary approach, which he regards as inherently religious and
 violent. Therefore, "the scientific movement carried out in a fashion of a
 missionary movement" would end up turning against its own objectives.
 The cultivation of rationality among the public through education also
 seemed impossible. After Zhou continuously revised his position, few
 options were left to imagine the enlightenment as a social movement.
 Zhou's abandoning of his earlier approaches resulted from both his
 self-reflection and his observations of the enlightenment movement. In
 the early 1920s, he criticized the radical approaches that were based on a
 belief of scientism, and he defended the legitimacy of mythology and the
 pedagogical use of myth. Although "unscientific," myth as the product of
 human psychology could not be simply dismissed as "backward"; it should
 be used in developing children's imagination and acquiring scientific
 knowledge (1922a: 530). From a scientific perspective, myth reflects the
 historical development of the human psyche (1 922 d: 563-565). To Zhou, the
 problems with those who opposed using myth in children's education were
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 19 Some twenty years later, he restated
 that only rationalists could know the
 origin and history of myth with the help
 of rational knowledge (1944c: 205-207).
 that "they have mistaken myth as facts and scientific knowledge. Therefore,
 they think that by reading myth, children will become superstitious for the
 rest of their lives, and even scientific knowledge cannot cure the problem."
 In his view, "superstition is harmful only when it is regarded as factual.
 If we recognize that it is not real, we can turn to focus on its aesthetic
 dimension" (1924c: 329). Scientific knowledge serves in the cultivation
 of self-awareness that allows one to differentiate the factual from the
 fictional, not for turning myth into a new belief. The "unscientific," the
 "backward," and the "superstitious" should all be subject to rational
 evaluation, not excluded.
 Zhou then turned the tables against the scientism-minded attackers of
 myth, arguing that the true believers of the magic power of myth were not
 those who studied them, but those who harshly attacked them; there was
 nothing "scientific" in their hostility toward mythology. In a 1924 essay,
 Zhou writes: "Regarding myth, people either believe it or reject it. Actually,
 both attitudes are the same in nature. Though they flaunt [their faith
 in] science, [the critics of myth] still ponder the possibility of believing in
 myth." He goes on to say: "those who attack Christianity are still Christians.
 Those who deny Confucianism are still Confucians" (1924b: 432). The
 enlightenment attack on mythology (and on tradition in general) derived
 from a fear rooted in a fundamental belief in and identification with the
 objects of their attack; the attackers sought to eliminate the objects in
 the name of science to avoid being affected by their power. With this kind
 of argumentation, Zhou transforms the enlightenment intellectuals into
 believers of superstition and tradition and problematizes their scientist
 goals.19 Such an analysis of the psychological state of these intellectuals may
 be speculative, but Zhou's point is that in relying on radical approaches, the
 mainstream enlightenment went awry. The only solution was to avoid the
 belief/disbelief dichotomy and cultivate a "skeptical and tolerant attitude"
 and to "do research on it with a sober mind" (1924b: 432).
 Zhou's apprehension of the dangerous tendencies in the mainstream
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 practice emerged from his strong objection to the Anti-Christian Movement.
 The movement in which many May Fourth intellectuals participated,
 proposed to eliminate Christianity in China for the sake of promoting
 science and resisting imperialist dominance. As Chow Tse-tsung (1 960: 324)
 puts it, "The new confidence in science, knowledge, clear thinking, and
 agnosticism" was among the popular arguments against religion during
 the May Fourth. The movement had been fermenting since 1915, but
 it exploded on the scene in 1922. Along with other beliefs, Christianity
 became the target of the enlightenment because of its nature as religion
 (Yang 1994: 48-49). When the World Student Christian Federation
 (Shijie Jidujiao xuesheng tongmeng) decided to hold its eleventh annual
 convention in Beijing, students in Shanghai organized the Anti-Christian
 Student Federation (Fei Jidujiao xuesheng tongmeng) in February 1922.
 The next month, students in Beijing organized the Anti-Religion Federation
 (Fei zongjiao da tongmeng), which, though "Anti-Christian" was not in its
 name, also targeted Christianity. The movement involved academic issues
 such as whether Christianity was "scientific," freedom of thought and
 speech, and the political and social role of Christianity in China (Yang 1994).
 The movement was supported by many of the May Fourth enlightenment
 intellectuals: Chen Duxiu, Cai Yuanpei, Wu Zhihui, Wang Jingwei, Deng
 Zhongxia, and Wu Yu. Zhou was among the few to voice contrary opinions;
 he wrote more than ten essays criticizing the movement, with a central
 focus on the need to protect intellectual freedom.20
 Zhou's essays constituted less a defense of Christianity per se than an
 apprehension about an emerging intellectual tyranny. For him, the Anti-
 Christian Movement portended a larger-scale intellectual oppression and
 persecution. In response to the movement's proposals, Zhou declared that
 he could not accept its intolerance of religion, which sounded "too old" to
 him (1922b: 610). He argued harshly against Chen Duxiu, who supported
 the movement for its anti-imperialist goals, insisting that the totalitarian
 approaches of the movement foretold a more general suppression of
 20 Lu Xun, notably, kept silent during the
 debate. Qian Xuantong, Shen Jianshi,
 Shen Shiyuan, and Ma Yuzao also op-
 posed the movement by signing the
 "Declaration of Supporters for Freedom
 of Belief" with Zhou (1922 d).
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 21 For example, Chen proposed in 1917
 that all religions, including Christianity,
 should be abolished and replaced by
 science (1917: 253) and in 1918 that the
 teachings of Christianity are "fabrica-
 tions, and cannot be proved" (1918:
 346). But Chen differentiated Jesus from
 Christianity as an institution and admit-
 ted that the love and spirit of sacrifice
 embodied by Jesus were lacking among
 the Chinese (1920: 84). In a 1922 essay,
 he further separates Christianity and the
 Church (1922a: 330-332).
 intellectual freedom (1922e: 61 1). Therefore, what was at stake here was
 neither whether science should prevail over Christianity, nor the legitimacy
 of resisting the imperialist influence; it was the ways the supporters
 of the Anti-Christian movement sought to eradicate Christianity. In his
 understanding, "the anti-religion participants want to eliminate religion
 itself, to confiscate the property of the church, or to demolish the temples
 in order to erase superstition and support science" (1927b: 68). For Zhou,
 such violent approaches in the Anti-Christian movement indicated that
 the enlightenment, which initially resisted traditional cultural hegemony,
 came to resemble that very cultural hegemony.
 The debates around the Anti-Christianity movement made apparent
 Zhou's disagreement with Chen Duxiu (Ozaki 2004: 161-162; Qian 2004:
 205) and some other important May Fourth intellectuals, such as Cai
 Yuanpei. Zhou saw the movement's ideas as an unacceptable violation of
 intellectual freedom. Chen's attitude toward Christianity was complex,21
 but as a political figure, he sided with the Anti-Christianity movement for
 both its anticapitalist and its antisuperstition agendas (Chen 1922b: 342).
 Cai Yuanpei proposed in 1917 to substitute aesthetic education for religion
 (1917: 30-34). He acknowledged the positive function of religion, which
 was to satisfy a psychological need, but criticized religion for not being
 disinterested: whereas religion stimulates emotion, aesthetic education
 moderates it. In 1921, he further declared that religion as a historical
 phenomenon was doomed to perish, and philosophy would take its place
 to become the new belief (1921: 70-71). The proposals of Chen and Cai
 shared a rationale: religion, particularly Christianity, had to be abolished,
 whether for political or intellectual reasons.
 Zhou insisted that individuals might deny their own religious faith,
 but religion itself would not perish (1924a: 416), an idea he borrowed
 from Havelock Ellis, who tried to answer the question How is religion still
 possible in modern times?
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 The function of religion, like that of love# is not necessary to life,
 nor may it with any certainty be stimulated into activity. Need it
 be? These functions are either working within you or they are not.
 If not, then it is clear that your organism is in no need of them at
 the present moment, and perhaps is born without the aptitude
 to experience them. (Ellis 1924: 1 1-13; Zhou 1925a: 56)
 In Ellis's view, religion is deeply rooted in the unique biological physicality of
 the individual, but it is not a universal human experience. This implies that
 the anxiety of both believers' and nonbelievers' experience on an individual
 level and the aggressive dissemination of religion on an institutional level
 are not necessary. Ellis then argues from another direction, "I do not,
 indeed, myself think that the inaptitude for the function of religion -
 ancient as the religious emotions are - represents a higher stage of
 development." By denying the superiority of atheist thinking, this kind
 of statement undermined for Zhou the legitimacy of the antireligion
 movements. Ellis continues, "But I am sure that either the function is there
 or it is not there, and that no intellectual speculations will take its place or
 hasten its manifestation. Religion, like love, develops and harmonises our
 rarest and most extravagant emotions. It exalts us above the commonplace
 routine of our daily life, and it makes us supreme over the world." With its
 positive functions, such as enabling believers to transcend the triviality of
 everyday life, religion needs to be tolerated. Tolerance means recognizing
 the legitimacy of differences and the diversity of the human condition.
 Although toward the end of the debate, Zhou eventually acknowledged
 its positive anti-imperialist goals (Qian 2004: 198-199), he insisted that
 freedom of belief was uncompromisable and that the violent approaches
 promoted by the movement were unacceptable. As he further explained
 later, it was because of the irreducible differences and unbalanced
 development among human beings that made tolerance necessary: "I know
 that humans have not developed evenly, and thought cannot and should
 not be unified. This is why I propose tolerance" (1927d: 393).
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 Zhou became more skeptical about the mainstream enlightenment,
 and all other "modern" social and intellectual movements. He was
 convinced that the enlightenment-inspired intellectual and social
 movements had taken on a strongly religious character and had become
 Boxer Movements in spirit. In a 1927 essay, inspired by Liang Shiqiu's
 (1998) use of the term to critique the state of modern Chinese literature,
 Zhou labels "romantic" the literary field and the larger sociopolitical
 situation (1927c: 98). By "romantic" he means both people's failure to
 see reality and their enthusiastic obsession with fanatic political and
 ideological beliefs. He ridicules the idea that what the era needed were
 "fantasy and faith" (1930b: 771). For Zhou, the popular trope of "saving
 the children," first raised by Lu Xun in his "Diary of a Madman," was
 empty sloganeering. To really address the problem of education, people
 needed to "have solid background knowledge first, and then can they
 form correct ideas." He then sharply points out that "enthusiastic faith is
 not dependable," and "relying on enthusiastic faith will make us fall into
 a new arbitrary way of thinking right after getting rid of the old ones"
 (1 934c/: 413); here Zhou makes an analogy between modern Chinese
 history and European history in which the Enlightenment was followed
 by Romanticism. For Zhou, the change from the "Enlightenment" to the
 "Romantic" era in China was not progress, it was regress.
 In his criticism of modern intellectual and political trends, Zhou
 invoked the semianthropological and semimetaphorical concept "return
 of the dead" (gugui chonglai), which he borrowed from Gustave Le Bon
 and Ibsen; the term suggests that "ghosts" haunt the minds of modern
 people (1923a: 153-154; 1925d: 224; 1928a: 509-511; 1933a: 135) and
 expressed his fear of the power of historical heredity, which he understood
 more metaphorically or culturally than biologically. To resist the "return
 of the dead" in the modern, Zhou chose to go back to history to identify
 the historical ghosts. In his "Reading Behind Closed Doors" (1928a), he
 announces his intention to turn his back on the contemporary world and
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 to enjoy reading history, a choice that progressive intellectuals criticized
 as an escape from the harsh reality of the White Terror. With a sarcastic
 tone, he justifies his decision by stressing the importance of seeking the
 historical roots of the religious thinking among modern people. He rejects
 the idea of a "new era" in China and argues that the modern was caught
 in the shadow of the past and ruled by reincarnated historical ghosts
 (1928a: 509-511). Through such pessimistic arguments, Zhou rejects the
 legitimacy of modern claims of "newness" and critiques the hubris of
 intellectuals who saw themselves as bearers of that newness. This "return
 of the dead" was not the sporadic "survival of the savage" in the modern;
 it constituted the "modern" itself.
 In the 1 930s and 1 940s, Zhou dedicated himself to a reexamination of
 the belief system of the traditional Confucian literātus, the "ghosts" that
 constantly returned to modern life, by focusing on Qing dynasty jotting
 notes (biji). Zhou justified his selection by arguing that the jotting notes
 better revealed their authors' unconscious minds than did their more formal
 writings, and he wrote down his findings in a similar style. Compared to
 the modern sanwen essay, his writings appear archaic, with numerous
 quotations from the Qing jotting notes accompanied by his own random
 comments; in terms of content, however, they can be regarded as a unique
 form of self-expression (Huang 1999: 105). Kiyama (2004: 74) argues that the
 moral judgments expressed in those essays are similar to those in ancient
 Confucian texts and in the literati jotting notes. But such a conclusion needs
 to be qualified: with few exceptions, Zhou offers more a critical revaluation
 of those moral judgments than an identification with them.
 He proposed that in terms of beliefs, the literati as a whole were no
 different from the less educated populace, who were obsessed with the
 afterlife:
 Among the populace, there are unwritten myths and rites to sup-
 port the practice of their beliefs. The written texts, including the
 Yuli chaozhuan, Yinzhi wen, Ganying pian , and Gongguo ge are
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 all treated equally as part of the Confucian canon by the literati.
 Therefore, it is not surprising to see that the thought of Chinese
 literati is dominated by the beliefs in spirits and deities, who con-
 trol the fortune and disaster in the human world. (1 935c: 693-694)
 In the texts Zhou mentions here, what prevailed was an imagined order
 of divine justice, in which retribution, instead of Confucian virtues, was
 at work. Such texts' popularity among the literati convinced him that the
 literati were no more rational or scientific in their way of thinking than
 the populace, and thus it was impossible for them to enlighten the latter.
 The only difference between the two, Zhou writes sarcastically, was that
 literati were reluctant to admit their true beliefs. They concealed it with
 excuses such as "promoting Confucian moral teaching with the aid of gods
 and spirits." In displaying their superiority over the populace, therefore,
 they invented their own theology with a Confucian mask.
 In Zhou's criticism, it was symptomatic that belief in spirits and deities
 dominated the literati consciousness. In his essay "On the God of Thunder"
 (1936b), he introduces the exotic case, recorded by Sun Dezu (1840-1905),
 of a female paragon of filial piety killed by the god of thunder; the woman
 turned out to have committed some crime in her early years, and the killing
 was retribution. Zhou strongly criticizes the rationale behind the tale:
 What Sun said is not just that there is a god in charge of our life
 in the Heaven. He believes that, no matter who issues the judg-
 ment, being it the god of thunder, fire, or wind, its judgment could
 never be wrong. If people were killed, they must have deserved
 it. Although they could appear to be virtuous when alive, there
 must have been some hidden evildoings to justify their death
 afterwards. On the other hand, those who could live on must
 also have deserved it, and they must have done significant good
 deeds. To be a bit farfetched, distorted argumentation like these
 really harms people's mind and morality. This is why I abhor the
 idea of retribution. (1936b: 217)
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 In analyzing the faulty logic behind the story, Zhou emphasizes the need
 for clearer thinking among the Confucian literati and the fact that they
 also betrayed Confucius's dictum to avoid discussion of the supernatural;
 they are, he says, no different from the blind followers of the White
 Lotus Cult (Bailian jiao). The idea of retribution was neither scientifically
 valid nor morally beneficial in cultivating human emotions; it served to
 sustain the conventional moral order by terrifying people into submission.
 Zhou summarizes with the following attack on the idea of retribution:
 "The favorite books of traditional Chinese are within three types: erotic
 writings, writings about neo-Confucianism, and writings about retribution.
 Erotic writings are acceptable as long as they are not vulgar and ugly.
 Neo-Confucianism is a valuable philosophy as long as it does not become
 insincere and pretentious. Only the writings about retribution are
 worthless" (1937b: 649). Occupied with such popular beliefs, literati could
 not create a rationalist culture of their own, not to mention enlighten the
 people. Although evolutionism pointed to some hope for future change,
 Zhou's theory of heredity squashed that hope (1945a: 620).
 As already mentioned, Zhou's criticism of the Confucian literati was an
 indirect way for him to reflect on the roles of modern intellectuals, who,
 including the proponents of enlightenment, were mere reincarnations of
 these "old ghosts." Modern intellectuals shared with their predecessors
 an irrational way of thinking and an enthusiasm for folk beliefs; the
 only difference between the literati and modern intellectuals lay in the
 content of their beliefs. For the latter, enlightenment itself had become
 a new belief system, one that served the ideology of progress. In Zhou's
 view, the new beliefs of enlightenment, national salvation, and the
 communist revolution were as irrational, oppressive, and violent as the old
 ones. Modern intellectuals therefore had to be self-reflexive; they could
 not regard themselves as representatives of any absolute truth with the
 right to violently eliminate the ghosts of the past, because those ghosts
 could possess the "new" intellectuals at the very moment they resort to
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 22 Zhou's proposal xin de qimeng
 yundong is not associated with the
 "New Enlightenment Movement" (Xin
 qimeng yundong) during late 1930s and
 early 1940s, which sought to popularize
 Marxism.
 irrationality and to radical and violent approaches. To Zhou's dismay, that
 was exactly what happened in the new "era of belief."
 A "New Enlightenment": Disenchantment through Rational and
 Aesthetic Transformation
 Zhou regarded himself as the only rationalist to resist the fanatic trends
 of his time. In reflecting on these trends, he developed his own approach,
 with which he endeavored to disseminate knowledge, to rationalize old
 beliefs through sympathetic understanding, to appropriate religious rites
 in practice, and to purge the fear and terror in beliefs with aesthetic
 methods. These are the core elements of his proposed "new enlightenment
 movement" (xin de qimeng yundong) of the 1930s,22 which he promoted
 through public media: "At a time of limited freedom of speech, it is better
 for newspapers to put aside their business in commenting on political
 issues and reporting current affairs. They can befriend ordinary people
 and provide them with common knowledge" (1935a: 615). Such practices
 might not be able to save the nation, but they were necessary to help
 individuals better understand themselves and emancipate themselves
 from the curse of beliefs. Receiving little public attention, Zhou's new
 enlightenment remained an individual endeavor and never developed
 into a "movement" (Ji 2010: 28).
 Zhou's framework for the "new enlightenment" started with
 a rationalization of the religious and superstitious. He relied on his
 understanding of the Darwinian concept of "the will of survival" to
 interpret all human activities, be they secular or religious, basic or advanced,
 material or spiritual:
 Human activities are the manifestation of the will of survival.
 Therefore, there is no practical way to fully renounce this world.
 Human activities, such as worshipping snakes and tortoises,
 cultivating the body in Daoist religion, pursuing eternal life in
 Christianity and in Buddhist Nirvana, and the ideological and
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 political efforts to build a paradise in this filthy secular world,
 all are manifestations of such will. The difference among these
 activities lies only in the approaches they take. It is difficult to tell
 which approach is material and which is spiritual. It seems that the
 desire for life manifested in Buddhism is much more extravagant
 than that in Christianity; in Christianity, it is stronger than that
 in Communism; and in Communism, it is stronger than that in
 secular politics. Nevertheless, this comparison should not suggest
 a hierarchy of "spiritual civilization." (1928b: 475)
 At a time when it was growing as a political movement in China, Zhou
 paid particular attention to communism. To him, communism is neither a
 "scientific" social movement nor a manifestation of evil; rather, it is simply
 a secular movement with strong religiosity. Other religious practices are not
 irrelevant to the secular world either. Contrary to the conventional wisdom
 that regards religious activities as a denial of life and an annihilation of
 the secular world, Zhou thought that religious and secular practices are
 essentially rooted in the same driving force. He even believed that the
 more religious an activity is, the stronger "the will of survival" it expresses.
 Worldly causes lay beneath the pursuit of the transcendental, and what
 differentiated religious activities from secular ones were the particular
 measures they took, not their nature. With such a theory, it became
 convenient for Zhou to include seemingly irrational cultural phenomena
 in the secular and rationalist world order.
 Zhou reinterpreted sacred texts as books of philosophy, history, and
 literature. He read the Bible as a book of humanism and nihilism;23 on
 Genesis, for example, he writes that the myth of creation "has been regarded
 as divine doctrine and historical facts. This view is of course criticizable, but
 we can investigate the thought and emotion expressed in the tale if we are
 aware of its status as an old tale" (1921a: 414-41 5). In the wake of the May
 Fourth denunciation of Confucianism and during the rise of the iconoclastic
 left, Zhou insisted on incorporating the Confucian canon into a modern
 education: it still could be read in modern times "as an ordinary book,
 23 For examples of his discussion of the
 Bible from literary and philosophical
 perspectives, see Zhou 1920, 1921a, and
 1929Ò.
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 24 For the KMT government's propos-
 als and policies on banning the lunar
 calendar and the traditional celebrations
 from 1928 to 1930, see Second Historical
 Archives of China 1994: 424-436.
 and could be a reference for young readers who have already acquired
 common knowledge. It is unnecessary to regard it as sacred, for there is
 no sacred book under the sun" (1934e: 14-15). His approach was starkly
 different from that of Lu Xun, who once suggested that young readers
 should refuse to read Chinese classics, because they could compromise
 their will to action (1925: 12-13). Zhou regarded such overpoliticized
 statements as exaggerated and insincere (1 966: 336). Although he rejected
 Buddhist philosophy as incomprehensible, he highlighted the "Buddhist
 spirit," which entailed a generous, compassionate, and dignified attitude
 toward humanity, and the willingness to sacrifice (1 944c/: 237-238). Zhou's
 attitude toward traditional religion and philosophy was one of inclusion
 and transformation; he believed that modern readers should not be told
 by an external authority what to read because they were mature enough
 to determine with a rational attitude the true nature of a text.
 Zhou was concerned about the vanishing of traditional celebrations
 in the face of modernization. In 1932, he discussed the significance of the
 Spring Festival, which was officially abandoned in 1 928 along with the lunar
 calendar.24 Although he recognized that it incorporated some "backward"
 religious elements, the festival could not be dismissed as trivial, a point he
 reinforces by citing Jane Ellen Harrison: "The religious impulse is directed
 to one end and one only, the conservation and promotion of life. This end
 is met in two ways, one negative, by the riddance of whatever is hostile,
 one positive, by the impulsion of whatever is favorable to life. All over the
 world, there are two kinds of religious rites which consist of expulsion and
 impulsion" (Harrison 1924: xii; Zhou 1932: 47). The Spring Festival provided
 an opportunity for people to ease the tensions in their tedious everyday
 lives, and therefore should be preserved in modern times to make life
 more tolerable. As Susan Daruvala (2000) and Charles Laughlin (2008) have
 argued, Zhou's functionalist interpretation (mostly inspired by Harrison)
 blurs the line between tradition and modernity.
 Zhou explored the genesis of beliefs and superstitions from a
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 psychological perspective, writing, "It is said that there is no god in heaven
 or beneath the ground. All that exists is but the projected shadow of
 the worshipers' feeling" (1937a: 530). In 1940, Zhou discussed the magic
 ceremony hua shuixian (seeking help from the water fairy), which sailors
 used in extremely dangerous situations at sea; the rite entailed mimicking
 paddling with chopsticks, praying, and chanting incantations. "Reading
 such stories," he writes, "often makes me feel sad. When the situation
 is beyond the control of human power, people have to resort to the
 supernatural. They use prayer and incantations. The eagerness for survival
 expressed in the rites is indeed lamentable" (1940: 305). Here praying and
 chanting were used as ways for dealing with life-and-death situations,
 when no practical measures were left, and thus should not be condemned.
 Although his views might be reductionist, Zhou rationalizes these rites
 as reflections of the human psyche. In the process, religious activities are
 desacralized and demystified, rendered transparent under a rational gaze.
 Zhou's essay "The Message from the Eternal Mother" provides a
 concentrated example of the various ways in which he reinterpreted and
 transformed folk beliefs with a rational understanding. Written in 1945,
 the essay discusses the Red Sun Cult (Hongyang jiao), which has a complex
 history and various branches with a mix of doctrines borrowed from
 Buddhism, Daoism, and other folk beliefs.25 The cult worships the Eternal
 Mother (Wusheng laomu). Living in the eternal home, she misses her
 daughters and sons suffering in the dusty world, and sends messengers to
 call them home before the world is eventually destroyed by a devastating
 calamity.26 In the essay, Zhou first confidently declares that as a person
 of "little faith" (x/aox/n), he refused to join any cult; still, he was able to
 understand and sympathize with the psychological and psychoanalytical
 drive of the cult's adherents (1945b: 545). Based on his earlier translation
 of Jane Ellen Harrison (Harrison 1924: 64; Zhou 1927a: 24), he draws an
 analogy between the cult and the Greek worship of the Mother and argues
 that the worship was a universal human belief, although it involved a
 25 The cult is also called Hunyuan Jiao or
 Hongyang Jiao. It was popular during the
 late Ming to mid-Qing period in northern
 China and was constantly suppressed by
 the government.
 26 For more information about the cult,
 see Song Jun 2002 and Seiwert 2003.
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 significant variety of magical and mysterious factors. Zhou elaborates his
 understanding in Freudian psychoanalytical fashion: "Objectively speaking,
 the Mother is always a mysterious figure. In their minds, people pursue their
 Mother's love and unconsciously regret being separated from their Mother
 at an early age, and have an instinctive desire to return to the embrace
 of their Mother" (1945b: 549). The cult, therefore, was an expression of
 universal human psychic desires.
 After analyzing the psychological/psychoanalytical aspects of the cult,
 Zhou turned to its literary aspects in its scriptures, arguing that it was the
 affective power of the scriptures that helped popularize the cult. Mixed
 with singing and recitation, the scriptures were written in the oral-related
 literary form of baojuan (precious scrolls), which was originally used to
 promote Buddhism and later became popular among many local cults.
 Among believers, these baojuan even acquired the same status as the
 Buddhist sutras. Zhou excerpted several passages to demonstrate how
 emotionally touching these scriptures could become:
 The Eternal Mother is longing for her sons and grandsons. / She
 is trying to send you messages.
 She sends out the messages time and time again, / but you never
 want to return to your heart and seek the Origin.
 At home, the Eternal Mother sheds tears upon thinking of her
 children. / She asks you to go home. / Stop indulging in insatiable
 desires in the sea of bitterness, / return to the Pure Land and go
 to the Soul Mountain, / and come sit on the Golden Lotus with
 the Mother.
 Sitting under the sun, the Mother is sailing the dharma boat. /
 She ferries her daughters and sons who lost their way home, / to
 meet their destiny and return to the Origin. / 1 persuade you all
 to start chanting the name of Buddha quickly. / Cultivate yourself
 and make progress.
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 The Eternal Mother has long been awaiting her sons and grandsons
 at the Longhua assembly.27/ She calls her sons, calls her daughters
 with tears in her eyes. / She is calling eagerly, but who is willing
 to answer back? (1945b: 549)
 Zhou points out that although unrefined in style, the text was
 "straightforward and powerful." The "I" narrator speaks directly to the
 audience ("you"), not to provide a rationale or apology for the belief but
 to perform the role of messenger and invite the audience to feel the need
 to reestablish their lost connection with the Mother. What message, then,
 was the narrator trying to send? Zhou regards it as a Messianic message,
 which offers redemption to the suffering masses.
 Members of the higher-class might feel the cult to be ridiculous.
 For the ordinary toiling masses who see no way out, however, it
 is like the situation when Avvakum's wife asks on their way being
 exiled to Siberia, "How long, my master, will these tortures last?"28
 Under such circumstances, what a relief it would be if they sud-
 denly hear such a Messianic message! (1945b: 550)
 Here the reference to Avvakum and Messianism was undoubtedly meant
 to highlight a universal aspect of the cult by situating it in the context of
 world religion. Zhou emphasizes that the desire for salvation derives from
 the suffering of individuals. When there is no way out in reality, "the will
 of survival" changes course to find an expression in the transcendental.
 In the baojuan text Zhou cited above, the Eternal Mother is portrayed
 not as an emotionally detached goddess but as a Mother figure who
 cares about her suffering sons and daughters. She not only represents the
 transcendental origin, but also satisfies the public's imagination of filiality.
 In addition, the power of the message not only works on a rational level
 but also stirs the emotions, which Zhou describes in this way: "It is not only
 about the fact that they are the children of the Eternal Mother. When they
 realize that their Mother is expecting them and calling them with tears in
 27 Longhua Assembly ( Longhua hui ) is the
 Dharma Assembly to be held by Maitreya
 when he becomes the Buddha and inher-
 its the present world from Sakyamuni to
 be in charge of the Future world under
 the tree named Longhua shu (Naga-pus-
 pa, dragon flower tree). The Assemblies
 are for ferrying people from this world of
 suffering to the eternal Future.
 28 Zhou is referring to the Russian proto-
 pope and writer Avvakum (1620-1682)
 and his wife's story. In 1908, Zhou
 translated Kropotkin's "Journey to Sibe-
 ria," which is about their exile. For an
 English version of Kropotkin's essay, see
 Kropotkin 1887: 128-129. The words of
 Awakum's wife are cited from this book.
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 29 Nevertheless, Zhou's sympathy for
 the cult did not go beyond the domain
 of the psychological and the emotional:
 he rejected it as a religious practice,
 and also rejected its often unintelligible
 doctrines and shamanistic rites (1945b:
 551-552).
 her eyes, how can people not be excited and grateful and think that they
 have found a place where they can eventually settle in with a peaceful
 mind?" (1 945b: 550). Emphasizing the power of human pathos, Zhou singles
 out "tear" as a key word: what attracts the believers first might be the
 tears of the Mother, not any doctrines. Joining the cult becomes a kind of
 family reunion. The cult is thus rooted in universal human experiences and
 sentiments, and there is nothing evil or mysterious about it.29
 Zhou also explored death-related beliefs in terms of "the will of
 survival." Death, particularly unnatural death, as part of everyday
 experience, is a recurring theme in Zhou's writing. Unlike Lu Xun, who
 tended to express anger at unjust deaths, such as those of his student Liu
 Hezhen and the "five martyrs" of the League of Leftwing Writers, Zhou
 accepted untimely death as part of humanity's competition for survival.
 Death-related beliefs and superstitions, including belief in ghosts and the
 afterlife, were not merely an object of knowledge for Zhou but a way to
 constitute the knowing subject.
 In his view, death epitomized a fundamental "split between the
 emotional and the rational," which he regarded as the saddest aspect of
 modern life and which reflected a larger irresolvable conflict between
 the scientific, the rational, and the materialistic, on the one hand, and
 the emotional and the sentimental, on the other hand (1925c: 181). For
 modern people, the aura of the otherworldly had faded away, and what
 remained were cold reality and hard "facts." In such a world, mourning
 and remembering are still needed. Zhou wrote when one of his students
 died of illness: "To mourn the dead does not necessarily mean to experience
 the agony and sorrow about the death of the person. It is more for our
 reminiscence, for us to lament the transience of life. No matter how
 materialistic or pessimistic a person can be, this sorrow is not easy to get
 rid of" (1 925c: 1 80). The unbearable sadness surrounding death, therefore,
 legitimized the desire to extend life beyond the limits of the physical world.
 Life after death had to be imagined to fill the void created by death.
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 Imagining life after death "not only eliminated the terror of death, but
 nurtured human emotional attachments to the dead. People always project
 their unfulfilled desires onto rites and myth, just as they express them in
 their dreams" (1 925c: 181). The afterlife thus reflected a layer of the reality
 in which we live, and religious or superstitious ways of dealing with death
 provided channels for the expression of human emotions.
 In this regard, Zhou departed from hardcore materialism, which tended
 to reduce life to physical and physiological phenomena. Having experienced
 the loss of a child himself, Zhou paid particular attention to the ways in
 which young children's deaths were imagined in folktales. In his discussion
 of these folktales, he observes that dead children are often summoned to
 serve the Heavenly Emperor, reincarnated after wandering as "homeless"
 ghosts, or become fairy ladies (1925c: 181; 1928a: 509; 1934c: 288-289;
 1937c: 543-550). These tales functioned as anesthesia for the parents to
 dull their unbearable pain: "These stories might sound ridiculous, but they
 are the very manifestation of the true beauty of human emotions. We are
 aware that such beliefs are superstitious, but . . . there are inherent factors
 of beauty and moral good in them. If the parents believed that there are
 ways to reunite with the dead, what a consolation it could be?" (1925c: 181).
 Through the lens of his modern rationalist thinking, the ridiculous
 and the superstitious were transformed into legitimate expressions of
 human emotions, which otherwise would never be fully articulated. Zhou
 argued that "the belief in the existence of ghosts is the opium for a life
 filled with misery and works as the last consolation for people's strongest
 sadness and terror" (1934c: 288-289). The opium metaphor reminds us of
 Marx's famous definition of religion as "the opium of the people" (1843:
 171), but whereas Marx's theory implies a revolutionary action to transform
 the conditions that gave rise to such an addiction, Zhou demonstrated a
 sympathetic understanding of religion as a kind of necessary painkiller.
 He even lamented the disappearance of "backward" beliefs with the
 rise of materialist and scientific thinking in the modern world. People in
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 the modern world may have lost faith in transmigration, reincarnation,
 and other forms of "opium/' but they suffered more for it because they
 no longer had any form of spiritual and psychological mediation for the
 traumatic events of life.
 Performing religious funeral rites, even without necessarily identifying
 with their underlying beliefs, could also bridge the divide between the
 emotional and the rational. Having experienced the death of strangers,
 students, and family members, Zhou was driven to seek appropriate
 methods of emotional expression. In 1921, while he was staying in the
 Western Mountains outside Beijing to recover from an illness, a guest at
 his hotel died. After his death, the hotel assistant tore off the page of
 the account book with his bill on it and burned it with some spirit money,
 and other guests also burned spirit money to mourn him. After learning
 about this small mourning ritual, Zhou thought that he lost the courage
 to laugh at "superstitious" activities (1921d: 392), and antisuperstition
 ideology seemed to him less important than the sympathy people expressed
 for the anonymous, lonely traveler who died far away from home; old
 "superstitious" rites were a form of humane action. In 1929, when his
 daughter Zhou Ruozi died, he felt unbearable sadness. As a materialist,
 he of course did not believe in an afterlife, but he could not face her
 death without emotional attachment (1929a: 582-583), and he invited
 monks to chant Buddhist sutras on the anniversary of her death (1930 d:
 101). When his mother died in 1943, he also "followed the custom"
 of using Buddhist funeral rites to feed the hungry ghosts (1943a: 667).
 These ritual practices seem insignificant against the larger social context,
 within which death could be either easily ignored or advocated as a grand
 sacrifice for a transcendent purpose; nevertheless, they are symbols of
 Zhou's rationalization of traditions. As he wrote in 1945, "according to
 the principles of the material world, the spirit perishes with the body.
 Taking human emotions into consideration, however, one can assume that
 the dead still exist during the memorial ceremony" (1945a: 616). Such an
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 "assumption" did not alter the objective truth of death, yet it did transform
 the old rites into pure forms of human emotion.
 Zhou insisted that to accomplish this transformation of beliefs and
 superstitions, the terror and fear embodied in them should be exorcised
 through art. He observed that all belief-related texts were still dominated
 with fear and terror without being transformed into any artistic works
 (1 92 1 e: 444). On a personal level, he discussed the influence on him of
 stories in Strange Tales of Liaozha i (Liaozhai zhiyi) and Random Notes from
 Night Talks (Yetan suilu): "Their writing style is acceptable, but some of
 the stories still make me afraid today. I do not believe in the existence of
 ghosts and monsters, but I always feel a chill when I'm in the dark, and
 this is a result of the negative impression they left on my mind" (1934g:
 290). Such terror caused permanent damage to his mind (1936d: 281). 30
 To him the ghosts, gods, and deities in Chinese culture were less human-
 friendly than those in other cultural traditions, as could be seen in the
 different representations of the thunder god in Japan and China. Whereas
 the Japanese treated the thunder god with humor, in China, tales about
 gods of thunder, fire, water, and wind were full of terror. To Zhou, this
 was a symptom of an unhealthy mentality (1936b: 221-222), and it was
 necessary to eliminate these elements of terror from Chinese culture to
 make it healthy.
 Greek mythology was Zhou's model for China. In his numerous essays
 about and translations of Greek mythology, he concentrated on a central
 idea: the purgation of fear and the transformation of religion into art. As
 he cited from Harrison:
 The remarkable thing is that the Greeks could not tolerate in their
 mythology the ugliness of the Gorgon. They turned the head of
 Medusa into the head of a lovely sorrow-stricken woman. In like
 fashion they could not tolerate the Gorgon form of the Earth-
 Mother. It was the mission of the Greek artist and the Greek poet to
 cleanse religion from fear. This is the greatest of debts that we owe
 to the Greek myth-maker. (Harrison 1924: 71-72; Zhou 1927a: 29)
 30 In 1918, Zhou included Strange Tales as
 a counterexample of his proposed litera-
 ture of humanity (1918: 89). In the 1930s,
 he abandoned such a radical view, but he
 was still not satisfied with the book. His
 view might differ from the general view
 that regards the book as of high artistic
 quality. I would argue that his comments
 are based mainly on his personal reading
 experiences as a child easily terrified
 by horror stories about travelers' being
 chased by zombies or dead soldiers'
 worrying about being eaten by home-
 less dogs, and therefore should not be
 regarded as an unbiased assessment of
 the book as a whole.
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 Clearly, the "ugliness" refers to inhumane and horrible elements. For
 Harrison, it was through artistic transformations that the humanist
 foundation of modern Western civilization was constituted. She explains
 how the Greeks accomplished such a transformation with the same religious
 materials common to other nations:
 What is characteristic of the Greeks is not the material, but their
 handling of it. Among the Greeks, religious imaginations and
 religious acts, though never perhaps without their influence on
 conduct, tend to become the impulse of two quite other forms of
 human activity - forms, both of which are often, though wrongly,
 regarded as alien to religion. These two forms are art, both literary
 and plastic, and philosophy. By the action of art and philosophy
 savage elements are eliminated, and, by this purgation from ig-
 norance, ugliness and fear, religion became, not only powerless
 to harm, but potent exceedingly for good. (Harrison 1921: 12-13;
 Zhou 1934^: 239)
 Zhou agrees with Harrison that art and philosophy are the most important
 devices used in the purgation of ugliness and the inhumane. He proposes
 that modern intellectuals evaluate the various forms of beliefs and
 superstitions and help transform them into artistic forms. Nevertheless, his
 proposal fell on deaf ears in the context of the national salvation project
 of the 1930s and 1940s and was little more than a monologue.
 Throughout his life, Zhou rejected violent and radical attacks on old
 beliefs and sought instead ways to bridge the old and the new through
 a transformation of the old. As he summarized in 1945, he preferred a
 profound understanding of religious beliefs and superstitions to hasty
 reform (1 945a: 61 6). In other words, he did not expect to transform social
 beliefs with his atheist philosophy; rather, he explored the ultimate causes
 of these phenomena, the roles they played in human life, and the ways
 in which they reflected and fostered human emotions. Therefore, the
 "new enlightenment movement" he practiced in the 1930s and the 1940s
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 was more an epistemologica! and psychological transformation (how
 we interpret and perceive the world) than a political action (how we
 change the world). Such a transformation took the form not of violent
 social movements, but of gradual dissemination of common knowledge
 among the public and of displacing the terror and ugliness with artistic
 interpretations of popular beliefs. As such, time-honored customs and
 beliefs might be preserved and become part of modern life.
 Conclusion: Chasing the Wind in a Meaningless World
 Zhou viewed the May Fourth, the leftist movement, and national salvation
 as fundamentally problematic because they lacked a self-reflexive
 dimension that could prevent the new belief system from violently replacing
 the hegemony of the old. He pessimistically pointed out that even though
 progress was theoretically possible, what was in fact happening was that
 the "new" turned out to be a reincarnation of the "old"; it was necessary,
 therefore, to return to the old and understand it more fully. Although
 Zhou's critiques in the 1920s were still more or less consistent with the
 enlightenment project of the day, his personal "new enlightenment
 movement" of the 1930s and 1940s was at odds with mainstream
 intellectual trends, and Zhou became something of an intellectual outcast.31
 While others discoursed on class struggle and national salvation, Zhou saw
 the examination of "the arrogance and ignorance of fellow citizens, and
 thinking about individuals' aging, dying, sickness and suffering" as a great
 enterprise. This endeavor may have been a fruitless one in a meaningless
 world, like chasing the wind, but for Zhou, not having to worry about
 ultimate outcomes made the process more enjoyable (1929b: 568).
 Zhou did not make any original contributions in biology, cultural
 anthropology, or sex psychology, but he used these disciplines to forge
 a new rationalist attitude, the goal of which was the emancipation of
 people's thoughts, not a sociopolitical revolution. Concentrating on the
 improvement of an individual's situation (acquiring knowledge to cultivate
 31 Zhou himself was partially responsible
 for this result because of the difficulty
 and obscurity of his texts. A case in point
 is the debate around his poems written
 for his fiftieth birthday in 1934. In the
 poems, Zhou portrays himself as a Confu-
 cian scholar reincarnated from a Buddhist
 monk who enjoyed various leisure activi-
 ties. Lu Xun was still able to understand
 the sarc stic implications in the allusive
 poems, but some younger leftist critics,
 such as Hu Feng, Liao Mosha, and Chen
 Zizhan, failed to grasp their subtlety
 and criticized Zhou harshly (Lin Fenfen
 2010). Therefore, it might be argued that
 Zhou's success in invoking traditional
 aesthetic categories to create his unique
 literary style, along with his self-claimed
 and widely accepted public image as
 "hermit," brought about the failure of
 the dissemination of his enlightenment
 ideas.
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 a rational attitude, cultivating refined taste in everyday life, etc.), he refused
 to periodize history according to political events in a teleological fashion.
 To Zhou# history was a process of change from the era of the collective and
 institutional to the era of the individual, from the dominance of belief to
 the rule of reason based on scientific knowledge. The grand projects were
 meaningful only when they could contribute to the emancipation of the
 individual; enlightenment was a precondition for the grand projects. But
 because enlightenment was a long-term, peaceful, and natural process of
 self-illumination through modern education and journalism, the grand
 projects would always be deferred.
 As Vera Schwarcz (1986: 301) points out, the history of the Chinese
 enlightenment is not finished. Zhou once regarded himself as having been
 born too late (in the nineteenth instead of the eighteenth century), but one
 could also say that he was born too early: the kinds of intellectual discourses
 he initiated in China did not receive significant academic attention until the
 1980s. After years of wars, famine, and revolution, enlightenment returned
 to capture the imagination of Chinese intellectuals. Today, debates on the
 May Fourth enlightenment and the whole Chinese modernization project
 continue. For some scholars, the May Fourth enlightenment was a model
 to be resurrected in the wake of Mao-era fanaticism; others, such as Yu-
 sheng Lin (1978), David Wang (1997, 2004), and Kai-wing Chow et al. (2008),
 have fundamentally questioned the May Fourth paradigm. Using Kanťs
 definition of enlightenment and parsing the etymology of the Chinese term
 for the enlightenment, qimeng, Deng Xiaomang (2006: 130) criticizes the
 proponents of the May Fourth and the new enlightenment movement in
 the 1 980s for their condescending attitude toward the public. Jiang Yihua
 (2000) even names the Chinese enlightenment as "enlightenment without
 reason." Zhou Zuoren constructed a mosaic of knowledge for understanding
 the human world, but was unable to work out an agenda for action. As
 he admitted, with his rational way of thinking, he lacked enthusiasm for
 action (1944e: 240). From a practical perspective, many activists still regard
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 the May Fourth as the source of their various enlightenment projects in
 the 1980s and 1990s, and have proposed "returning to the May Fourth"
 as a mode of resistance to the totalitarian political order (Li Shenzhi 2001 :
 37). But which "May Fourth" to return to# and how? The enlightenment
 Zhou proposed derives from the European Enlightenment which has been
 accused of leading to many of the catastrophes of modern history (Schmidt
 1996: 1). If Zhou's mode of enlightenment had succeeded in China, would
 it face the same sort of accusations?
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